February 4, 2012

Drawing Alan Shearer.

It’s easy to forget just how incredible a player Alan Shearer was. The dire and dour style in which he presents Match Of The Day totally betrays the enthusiasm and passion for the game he showed when he played. I consider myself lucky to have grown up watching him at Newcastle United, I was 12 when he signed and 22 when he retired. Those two points themselves serving as bookends either side of the ten year period of my own passage from a child to an adult. I ‘grew up’ in it’s true sense, watching Alan Shearer.

During that time there was no Opta, no Prozone, and no chalkboards. Statistics existed purely in the factoid form favoured by commentators such as Motson; a stream of information that was for the most part trivia, simply numbers and dates, the Guinness Book of Dull Footballing Miscellany - not analysis or insight in any useful form..

And it’s almost impossible to go back to games from this era and analyse pass completion, distance covered, chances created, interceptions made etc. We are left with video footage of goals, a few key incidents and matches, but little else. The advantage or charm of a more mathematically innocent time in football would be an interesting discussion for another time, but we are left with the question of how to represent how our heroes played when the only ‘raw’ data we have is piecemeal or static..?

A fascinating video appeared on YouTube on the 22nd January, I’ve no idea how they did it, but someone has complied all 206 of Alan Shearer’s goals into one 25minute marathon down memory lane. The video is found below. It is well worth watching in it’s entirely. In full screen. A good few times.

Obviously I am a fan of the numbers of football, but more importantly how to display them in a format above raw data. How can we represent in a more graphical fashion, or in a way more evocative of our actual experience of these moments.

The planar nature of the chalkboard always grates on me; football is a game played in three dimensions. A difference in the height of a pass of only a foot can result in hugely different outcomes. A pass shown on a plan-format chalkboard can look short, simple easy - it shows nothing of the trajectory it’s made from, the direction the player is actually looking, the pace taken off the ball etc.

From this juncture, I ask myself, if Alan Shearer scored that many goals, what percentage of the 17.86m2 area that the posts and crossbar frame did he actually pass a ball through? Were certain areas targeted more than others? With the shear(!) amount of goals scored, a visual exploration of this question would be fascinating. But there’s no Opta, there’s no chalkboards, no quick-fix, no readily accessible information, how does one do this? I had an idea, but it would be laboursome. If I can watch every goal, I can log every goal - I can input the raw information myself. And luckily in my job I use 3D modelling software nearly every other day.

As I watched Shearer’s goals rack up, it reminded me just how ‘complete’ a footballer was. A particular sore point of mine is the ‘average’ position. It’s about as arbitrary and intangible a graphical representation of a player’s positioning as you could possibly find. Totally without context. It’s conceivable that a player will never actually have been in his ‘average’ position over the course of a game. I digress… Alan Shearer did not have an ‘average’ goal, or rather his goals did not fit a ‘typology’. Much unlike reductive analysis of Andy Carroll’s “game”, in that ‘he’s the big man scoring headers’, a proper analysis of Shearer would show no such simplistic theme.

How did he score then? Well, like this…

The above diagram plots the trajectory of all 206 of Shearer’s conversions in a single goal. It perhaps would have been nice to illustrate Shearer’s goals with a separate Leazes/Gallowgate diagram, and maybe for away goals too, but using a single goal we get a ‘truer’ and more complete sense of where these strikes came from.

It’s a stylistic indulgence to present the goals in the above way, it looks cool. It shows the variation in range, and it also shows the variation in the point at which the ball crossed the line. Now I have the model, I can view it from any position in 3D space, and I’ve spent a lot of time exploring this; how does it look from the dugout? what’s the keepers perspective? what about a ‘true’ architectural elevation, with no perspective? There are countless ways to view the goals, all with their own idiosyncrasies.

Contrast this with the below, the ‘chalkboard’…

Obviously it still looks pretty decent - we know it’s all the goals scored (the club record), by a player of unquestionable loyalty and passion, born and raised in the city that that he dedicated a decade of his playing career to. Amazing. However the diagram still lacks something that the above has though, a more emotional or nuanced representation of the shots, that is somehow lost when viewed from above.

Everyone has their favourite Shearer goal, but what about the man himself’s top three? Thankfully he’s not kept them secret, in this video he describes them: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZcjCi0IkEw&feature=related

#3. Newcastle/Villa. 3rd November 2001.

A floated Rob Lee pass finds Shearer at the corner of the six yard box. It’s volleyed obliquely past Schmiechel in front of the Gallowgate. The goal we all dream of scoring. Shearer himself says, “There’s still a part of some people that think that was a cross.. But it wasn’t”. I believe him.

#2. Newcastle/Chelsea. 25th April 2004.

Shearer receives the ball over 20 yards out. Desailly is turned, and the resulting shot loops over a motionless Ambrosio. Shearer takes us through it: “I’ve thought ‘he is too tight to me here’, I can turn him, and that’s what I’ve done, I’ve moved it.. and just sort of shot.” An absolutely outrageous strike, and still probably only the 5th longest goal Shearer scored.

#1. Newcastle/Everton. 1st December 2002.

The 86th minute, time running out, Shearer produces probably one of the best goals I’ve ever seen, out of nowhere. A stunning goal from outside of the area. Shola assist. “It was just a matter of hit it, and see what happens.. 499/500 of them I think would have gone in the top row of the Gallowgate end.” I disagree Alan, I think you’d easily be hitting 1 in 10 of them. Incredible.

The 201st. Newcastle/Portsmouth. 4th February 2006.

Now there’s a happy accident if ever there was one.. It’s just been brought to my attention that it is 6 years to the day that Alan Shearer broke Jackie Milburn’s goalscoring record in front of the Gallowgate against Portsmouth. I had no intention of coordinating such an anniversary with this post, but it’s only right to illustrate such a special goal alongside Shearer’s own top three. I especially like this goal because other than the fact it was the 201st, there really isn’t anything ‘special’ about it - it is simply vintage Shearer: running onto a through ball on the edge of the box, using exceptional strength to hold off a challenging defender, and then still have the composure to calmly slot the ball just to the right of an advancing goalkeeper and into the centre of the goal. It’s exactly the sort of chance we expected he would take, and invariably did. You can find it at around 25:22 on the above video.

PELANTY!

Alan Shearer scored 46 penalties for Newcastle United, 22% of his total goals scored. The graphic below shows the variety of scoring. Left, right, centre, high, low. Apart from Shola Ameobi, I’ve never been so confident when watching one of our players preparing to take a spot kick. One thing this graphic can’t convey is the velocity that these penalties are hit at. Shearer wasn’t a ‘placer’. Every single one of these was lashed in as hard as he could. Often the successful strikes down the middle are not due to the goalkeeper guessing incorrectly and diving to one side, but simply the ball being hit so hard they are incapable of keeping it out.

The logging, modelling and exploration of the data I collected over the course of a few hours last night was hugely enjoyable. I’m often the first to moan about Shearer’s shirts and Shearer’s views on MoTD, but writing this has brought about a much needed re-setting in my opinion of him that had been unjustifiably lowered. What does a punditry career really have to do with a playing career anyway?

I’m glad I’ve been reminded, this is the Alan Shearer I want to see in my head when I hear his name, not the inoffensive BBC-man with his peach satin shirts. I want the vociferous, scrapping, bloodied, elbowing, net-bursting, bastard in the above video - one arm in the air in celebration, peeling off to gaze into his adoring Gallowgate looking back at their hero, in the way and the place that the hero himself used to look back at his.

That’s what Alan Shearer looks like.

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Note: thanks to the http://www.shearer9.com/ website for filling in a few gaps, and to the uploaders of both the videos cited.

January 29, 2012
SJP. Row P. L7. My old seat in the distance in centre of frame, #391.

SJP. Row P. L7. My old seat in the distance in centre of frame, #391.

January 11, 2012

I Just Can’t Get Enough.

I absolutely hate the January window. I’d rather it didn’t exist; pick your squad for the season, and live with it for the 38 games you play, if you get caught short then tough, you should have planned better. I dislike the way it allows a club, realising they are in a poor position, to simply ‘buy’ their way out of trouble. I expect QPR to be this season’s manifestation of this, it normally goes hand in hand with a managerial change. Further to this is the absolutely moronic Football Manager style speculation and innuendo about who clubs are, aren’t, or might be signing.

That said, this window in particular is of huge interest to me because I think a few points of our apparent policy, which I’ve wrote a lot about, may be tested. The main ‘tests’ I explore below.

1) Younger, Better, Cheaper.

Probably the most important, and overarching, facet of our policy. As in the post below, all our signings during under Pardew (and many before) have fit the mould of being younger, [potentially] better, and cheaper than what we have at that moment. This will be easily tested, and players that we have actually made offers for, (Tomkins, Corgnet), certainly fit that bill. (*and also Ravel Morrison since originally posted.)

2) Older, Worse, More Expensive.

The flipside of the previous point, again discussed below. We have not signed any players permanently of the above description. Not doing so in this window would further reinforce the commitment to the strategy. The rumoured deal for Alex of Chelsea is a prime example of an ignorance of what appears to be a very rigid element of the policy.

3) Expensive. Old. Out.

One of the most unexpected and pleasing transfer news of 2011 for me was actually the retention of Jonas.  In the wake of Joey leaving, many fans resigned themselves to losing all our ‘better’ and ‘older’ players by default – Jonas’ contract deal ended that talk. Will this window will be see another more senior player, on good money, sign a new contract a la Spiderman, or will we have another Barton/Nolan/Enrique situation? It remains to be seen, but if all we do in this window is sign Coloccini on an extended contract, with him ‘buying in’ to the current NUFC project when he will have ample suitors at home and abroad, I’ll be a happy boy.

4) What is a “Silly Price” (Pardew in December)

Cheick Tiote remains a constant source of anxiety for Newcastle fans, the will/he won’t move on will continue all through the window. In Andy Carroll, there is a clear precedent for a ‘younger, cheaper, better’ player being sold if a ridiculous bid came in. What is the comparative amount for Tiote? What has he ‘cost’ us so far? To date, assuming no sign-on fee..

£3,500,000 = Signed for.

£208,000 = 6 months (26 weeks) at £8,000/week.

£2,080,000 = 1 year (52 weeks) at £40,000/week

TOTAL = £5,868,000

The graph above illustrates how that figure compares with Tiote’s remaining contract value (estimated £40k/week for 5.5 years), and then various successive profit increases. Lets not forget, by trade Ashley is a retail man and has made many billions in that sector with a sell cheap/buy cheaper strategy.

Many of the numbers thrown around in the media to acquire Tiote put the figure between £15-20m – an astonishing profit of 200-350%. Considering a ‘typical’ retail mark-up is anything between 20-50%, is over ten times that “silly” enough that only a fool could turn it down? We’ll have to wait and see..

5) Project Player

As well as Tiote, there a few names being linked away from NUFC that I would call ‘project players’. That is, players brought on board by Ashley (for the most part), under his rules and structure. This is the most interesting aspect of the window for me. Yohan Cabaye, Tim Krul, Cheick Tiote, Demba Ba have all been ‘linked’ with moves away, (whatever that means, I’ll cover it some other time), and all are part of our current project. But what even ‘is’ that project?

i) The Just-For-Profit Project?

The worst-case scenario. With little regard for progression as a football club, though naturally that has to happen for this to work, NUFC are simply a feeder club; identifying players, buying cheaply, developing them, and then selling on for profit. Don’t get attached to players, don’t expect big stars, even known names. No ambition, cash is king.

ii) The Slow-Toon Project?

The best case scenario. It’s not about money, it’s about a fresh perspective. FIFA fair play rules will alter the monetary landscape of football significantly. Are we ahead of the game? Our fiscal policy is similar to progressive German clubs, and historically successful French ones. Young, hungry players are not necessarily a commodity to be traded, though inevitably this will happen, but are a means to a greater end. The ‘end’ is the same as project i), profit, but recognises that the higher you achieve the higher your income.

iii) The Prove Your Worth and You Will Be Rewarded Project?

This combines the above two, and has just become even more interesting on reading a tweet that has just popped up in the corner of my screen.

Tiote is a precedent here, and Jonas to an extent, but the Ba development above is very interesting. If our strategy is buying players cheaply (ie. low risk), we can take the best from both options above. If they’re a success, then we either develop them for our own gain, or to sell on. If the player bombs, we’ve not lost much money, they can be moved on, and we try again. If the player is successful early in the season their contract can be renegotiated, increasing their value, self-worth, and drive both prior to and subsequent to the improved terms.

What happens next with the Ba situation will be fascinating. So far it’s history repeating itself. It’s exactly what happened with Tiote when he showed he was a truly quality player. If he does only improve his terms, and stays at NUFC for the rest of the season, we should be very, very encouraged.

What happens with Tiote next is different, and currently without precedent. No ‘project player’ has left yet, we are in unchartered waters. Whatever does occur though may well indicate what might happen with Ba in the summer, next January, or next summer.

If Tiote is retained, bids rejected by the club, and the player is not unsettled by a ‘bigger’ club or bigger carrot, we have a really strong and encouraging signal that Mike Ashley may not quite be the fat money-stashing/stealing fool that we always feared, but may actually be building something really decent. What a signal it would be to the fans, the players, the potential players, the rival clubs and the game if this were to happen. I must add the caveat, as always, that there have been some catastrophic PR decisions by the man, and I really hope he takes some publicity advice from his new shirt sponsor.

That said, if Tiote is moved on for not what you would call an ‘Andy Carroll’ amount that you simply can’t refuse, and is merely shifted for maybe 50 or 100% profit, we should be a little disheartened, though not devastated. The fact that we should always have young, able reinforcements, is intrinsic to both paths. If Tiote, Krul and Ba do go, Abeid, Vuckic, Ben Arfa, and Elliot plug the gap left. If this policy works again, those players really crack on in the second half of the season, young replacements are sourced and acquired in summer, and the above are moved on shortly afterwards. The cycle repeats itself. Selling more than one player is very high risk in my opinion, high enough for me to lean towards thinking even than one is very unlikely.

What our actual strategy is isn’t clear yet, but window by window, actual move by actual move, it is slowly revealing itself to us. I absolutely hate January, but just I can’t get enough of it this year.

January 3, 2012

NUFC transfer policy through the ages.

The graph below illustrates the ages of players Newcastle United have signed from Ronny Jonsen in 2004 to Rob Elliot in 2011 in chronological order. Age is plotted on the Y-axis and sequentially each player along the X-axis. For the purposes of examining buying trends, I have included all permanent transfers and omitted any trial, loan and released players.

We can see that moving from Souness to Pardew, via Roeder, Allardyce, Keegan, Kinnear and Shearer, the line of regression plotting the average age a player has been signed has fallen from 26 to 22. What is also clear is the ‘under-26’ policy which appears after the Pancrate/Lovenkrands deals when 29 years old, (about 2/3 along the x-axis). Beyond those signings all players fall below the 26 year cut off. That the average age of these players signed is just 23 is pertinent too - contrast this with Allardyce-tenure signings which have an average age of over 26.

Again, one cannot just view the numbers in isolation, the context of these signings must also be examined, and what happened to them. All played their part in NUFC history, but in recent years we have seen the departure of older, big name players, signed on big money long-term contracts (as explored below), as part of the ‘buying young and better’ model Ashley has adopted.

Buying young, and buying better… now where have we seen that before….?

The similar graph above plots permanent playing incomings all the way back to Sir Bobby Robson’s first acquisition, Kevin Gallagher. During his time as manager, which takes us from 0 to about 1/4 along the X-axis, (to the 27 year old Stephen Carr), the average age of a player signed is just under 23.

After this time, up until the spate of signings including Zamblera, Vučkić, Ranger, Soderberg etc. by Kinnear and Keegan, the majority of players signed are above 25. It is well documented that the degree of influence in transfer policy those managers was not huge. The ‘policy’ was that of Mike Ashley, and an early indicator that amongst the managerial and contractual circus that was playing out in the public eye, player recruitment remained restricted by a systematic adoption of younger, cheaper, and potentially better, players.

Look at how the line of regression changes from Sir Bobby in October 1999 to Alan Pardew in 2012: it doesn’t. The current and historic policies balance each other out, so that when taking into account the more senior signings of Souness, Roeder and Allardye, the ‘typical’ age of a player signed over this time appears constant.

We have effectively reverted to a recruitment style that brought us fast, hungry, young players like Bellamy, N’Zogbia, Woodgate, Milner - and the pacy football that was a direct result of this persuasion.

All of those players were eventually sold-on, but not before we got out ‘moneys worth’ out of them in a playing sense. If we are also incorporating this element of that transfer strategy into our current policy that I discussed below, (#YoungerCheaperBetter), I would conclude that our financial prudence in the transfer market gives us great justification in maintaining optimism for the future comings and goings at St James’ Park.

December 28, 2011

The numbers [don’t] lie.

The graph below shows an extrapolation of data taken from The Guardian’s “Chalkboard” system. In greyscale you have a graphical plot of the cumulative passes both attempted (grey) and completed (black) under the management of Chris Hughton as permanent manager. The same is also presented for our time with Alan Pardew in charge with the dark and light blue plots relating to passes attempted and completed respectively.

I am a huge fan of Pardew, and fully signed-up for watching and defending the football he advocates off the pitch and tries to implement on it. The degree to which this intended style of play has engendered our current high-stock in Ligue 1 as well as assisting in the acquisition of players of known passing accuracy and élan such as Yohan Cabaye and Mehdi Abeid is not fully known, but there have been numerous articles and interviews both here and in France where they have praised what Newcastle United and Alan Pardew are trying to do. As I am currently halfway through my first season of concentrated following of the French top division and hugely enjoying it, this encourages me for the future when inevitably we are required to replace sold players. Young, French players will be attracted to us because of our technical and accomplished style of play, right? Maybe not..

The graph above actually shows Hughton both attempting and completing more passes than Pardew game-on-game. When looking at their time from an average perspective, the results below are found.

Under Pardew we are making/completing around 50 passes less per game than under Hughton. This would not seemingly matter were the statistics of these passes to show an increase in accuracy via completion, but the chart to the right shows that this is not the case. The actual figures are 72.1% for Pardew and 73.7% for Hughton.

To be honest, this is not the piece I expected to write. I am actually quite surprised with what the last couple of hours research have shown. I remember a far more direct, longer, and speculative passing system under Hughton, mainly to best utilise the trio of Barton, Nolan and Carroll, but I hadn’t expected to find that system incorporating more exchanges.

What to take from this then? Pardew is actually a charlatan? That we’d have been better sticking with Hughton? The system is failing? I would say no to all three.

Simple ‘passing’ statistics cannot illustrate fluidity, technicality, speed, or expectation. These qualities are impossible to quantify in a graphical, mathematical fashion, and therefore to use data to analyse. It’s far better to compliment these numbers with your memories; think back to how you felt watching us play last season in comparison to this, in doing so one may find reason to give Pardew credit, despite his 1.6% passing completion deficit on Hughton.

On reflection the above only reinforces my current belief that we should be careful not to read everything into mathematical analysis of football. Read a lot, but not too much. I thoroughly enjoy the analysis of Prozone, Zonal Marking, EA/EPL index et al - it’s refreshing to have a degree of cerebrality emerging as an antidote to the tired, archaic, and clichéd musings of dinosaurs such as Hansen, Lawrenson and Coyle, but that said, the numbers aren’t absolutely everything.

The ‘crosses completed’ by Gabriel Obertan can be logged, and held up as an example of a ‘bad winger’, but how do we quantify the distance he has carried the ball away from our goal a game? Or how many square metres he has opened up for Yohan Cabaye or Hatem Ben Arfa by drawing two, sometimes three, opposing defenders to him? Do we need a ‘yards carried’ database, as well as a ‘space opened’ chart? How would we even record this information, let alone display it? I would love to see it.

In summary; we’re playing better football now, and it makes me happy. I sought out some maths to ‘prove’ that we are and I found results showing the opposite (in the traditional sense.) What actually ‘proves’ our progression to me is my own (subjective) emotional and empirical experience our games, and not solely a reflection on our games’ genetic makeup. An over-reliance on the numbers of football is just as bad as an ignorance of them. Analysis of games by percentages will naturally miss unquantifiable facets of game just as easily as those too focused by a gut-reaction to an individual player’s attacking performance live may miss key contributions to the team’s dynamic as a whole.

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End note: Please look up the outstanding On Goals Scored blog for some attempts to ‘cut through’ the pure mathematics of football and graphicise some of the more emotional and intangible qualities of our game.

http://ongoalsscored.wordpress.com

http://ongoalsscored.wordpress.com/2011/10/20/nufc-5-0-mufc-five-goals-fifteen-years-two-dimensions/

http://ongoalsscored.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/city-six-tee/


December 16, 2011

Transfers & Me.

The last time I wrote about transfers and Newcastle United I used an elaborate and self-indulgent Merlin sticker album metaphor to make what turned out to be some ludicrously wayward predictions. Half a season on, we are again. The fear for the fan is always losing the ‘key’ player, the icon, the talisman. But breeeeaaaaathe. As with most things, not just in football but in life too, the thought or the fear of something is often disproportionate to the experience or the encounter and the acceptance of the object of fear when it presents itself in reality.

So what is our transfer policy? To answer that one must first define, or tease out a definition for what a policy actually is. Policy implies rules, rules imply strategy, strategy implies predetermination, and predetermination implies principled thought. A transfer policy, in the sense of a system with financial, political and personnel constraints requires maintenance - being that it’s associated variables are not static, but in continual flux as form, value and demand ebb and flow. Players will be bought and sold. This is a reality. The facetious and juvenile criticism as a club as a ‘selling club’ only shows naivety or chosen-ignorance of how the modern game works, and I’m not sure which is worse.

Let’s assume that Newcastle United, by that meaning it’s owner, chairman, scouts, and heads of finance, do indeed have a policy towards player recruitment, retention and release - is it possible to extrapolate, or predict to some extent what we may experience as fans during the emotional wringer of the January transfer window? For the purposes of this piece I am talking about Newcastle United, under Mike Ashley, from when Alan Pardew was taken on. I believe this was a key moment in the Ashley era, when he finally, after accidental, populist, baffling and necessary appointments, got ‘his’ man, and could properly implement ‘his’ policy.

Firstly, why do we sell players? Funnily enough, despite his cerebral posturing that I for one am not buying, I believe Joey Barton came as close to anyone to defining what the current Newcastle United transfer policy is, and ergo why they sell players, when he claimed he was being forced out as the board pursued “younger, cheaper, better” players. I don’t think this based on any serious analysis on his part, much the opposite, it would not surprise me if Joey is repeating something that as been said to him by a member of the NUFC hierarchy verbatim. As a consequence of this spoken/unspoken definition, older, more expensive, and less able players find their position at the club at risk.

To test the theory, one examines if any of the players we have sold since January 2010 contradict this tripartite rule for when to sell a player? The first team players, or those that could be considered for a first team place, that have left (not including loans or trials) since then are Campbell, Kuqi, Nolan, Tozer, Barton, Zamblera, Routledge, Enrique, Lua Lua and Andy Carroll. The diagram below shows just one anomaly, though we will come to him later. All of the other players we have released have satisfied at least one of the three criteria for being considered for transfer, according to what I would put as the club’s perspective, through the conduit of Joey Barton’s uncontrollable mouth.

We now test the reverse, do any of the players brought in during the same time period lie outside the reciprocal diagram? Players signed on permanent deals are Ben Arfa, Marveaux, Abeid, Cabaye, Ba, Obertan, Santon, Elliot and Kuqi. Again, all of these players satisfy at least one attribute, and most satisfying all three. The policy appears to be exactly as Joey said.

Of course it’s more difficult to say exactly whether any of these players definitely are ‘better’ than those they replaced, but based on performances thus far we can have a pretty good attempt. Is Yohan Cabaye better than Kevin Nolan? I would say yes, in every single way, though statistically not in ‘goals scored’ – but then how many goals conceded last season were actually caused by the lack of tracking back from Nolan? In pulling players out of position to cover, spaces open up… Maybe it balances out, maybe it doesn’t, but certainly I think we have seen enough of Cabaye to make a good argument for him being a ‘better’ player than Nolan.

Before I continue, the pony-tailed elephant-in-the-casino has to be discussed – and in light of comments made my Alan Pardew this week regarding future sales of players, the discussion is even more pertinent. I believe the sale of Andy Carroll sale was an exception to a tripartite transfer principle we now have in place. It was a transfer simply so ridiculous it could not be turned down. £35m for a relatively unproven, raw, young, troubled, albeit able player, was impossible to turn down. The spending of ‘The Carroll Money’ is an issue for another day, but in terms of transfer policy, the move was sanctioned despite Carroll seemingly satisfying all three positive criteria because the amount of money offered could theoretically pay for the recruitment of players for many seasons to come. Whether it will, or be ‘pocketed by fat-ash’ will only become apparent over time, one only notes that it could.

It is easy to say one has ‘tested’ a theory when working with only limited source material, and so ‘conclusions’ must inform only cautious predictions. Patterns, principles and laws only begin to emerge as more data is factored into any testing of a theory. There is some odd part of me that is excited to see how the coming month plays out; will we see a further progressive development along a crystallising trajectory, or will it all go to shit again like we have seen it do many times before?

I would offer that it may not be as bad as we think, and again I refer to Joey Barton’s take on things. At the height of the media-circus that precusorsed his move to Queens Park Rangers, Joey made the ominous prediction regarding club departures that it was ‘#jonascoloandjosenext’. On the face of it, it appears possible, all three could be plotted within at least one of the older, more expensive, and less able criteria, with Jonas and Coloccini in two. As we know Jose left, and the signs did not appear good; if the Argentinian duo didn’t go in the summer window, they’d be going in the next. However, out of the blue, and with very little public expectation for it, a new contract was announced for Jonas. A ray of hope.

Up until that point we hadn’t seen any retention of players who were not of the ‘younger, cheaper, better’ definition. As one of our senior players, that could still command a decent transfer fee, it was pleasantly surprising to see that the policy would not be employed without recognising context. The ‘dressing room cabal’ element of the Barton/Nolan transfers, and the subsequent ostracising of Steve Harper, has been covered elsewhere ad nauseaum, but one would note that it is surely no coincidence that not only were the known ‘dissenters’ duly transferred, but that a log running bonus-saga was resolved shortly after their departure. Barton’s situation would be especially similar to that of Jonas; players of advancing age, on good money, still of good ability but by no means irreplaceable. In light of Barton’s move, surely the sale of Jonas was, I would offer, more likely than his retention. To me it is obvious; Barton’s childish and greedy attitude was what ultimately cost his his place at a club that he was very happy at, and would explain his total bitterness to those that called his bluff and moved him on. Jonas was signed up and precedent set; just because you may be older, more expensive or less able, it does not necessarily follow that your days in black and white are numbered – just remain professional, do your job, and you may be retained.

The elaboration above is important, and to me one of the most encouraging occurrences off the field this season. (I will caveat this by saying there has also been a maelstrom of idiocy, I know, but that is not for here). I say this because I believe it is a clear indicator that what I dearly hope doesn’t happen in January, won’t – and that we may be hit blindside by a Jonas-eque contract announcement in the second half of the season when the best central defender I’ve ever seen play for us, agrees to finish his career at St James’ Park. The love of my life for (footballing) life.

However, I’ll give with that hand but take with another. Jonas set one precedent when he signed that deal, but another more immediately relevant one was put in place when Chelsea gave Liverpool £50m for one player.

I’ve been thinking about it all day, contextualising within all discussed above, but I have come to the conclusion that Cheick Tiote will definitely be sold in January. This is nothing to do with the youngerbettercheaper principle, or any ‘cashing in’ but that a few teams are really desperate for a world-class player in the same position and when that happens, the money gets silly. Liverpool didn’t even mind paying £35m for Carroll, all they cared about was getting £15m more for Torres. In January Manchester United, Arsenal or Tottenham will offer money that could easily be 6 times what was paid for Tiote. Now we talk about ‘selling our best players’ and the ‘lack of ambition’ it shows, but we really have to accept this is part of the game now. And it’s the same thing we did when we took Tiote for a steal, were we a ‘buying club’ then? What we do have in his position, which interestingly we didn’t have when we sold Carroll, is proven, able cover. Best, Shola and Lovenkrands stepped up, but if Cheick does go, we will not be left as wanting.

In summary, we’ve got to be realistic, but the plan seems a good one. I alluded to this when I tried to condense the above 10,000 characters into 140, but to wheel out Keegan’s favourite cliché; I want to be entertained. You get no choice in who you support, but I got a pretty damn good hand with Newcastle United. The current owner/board are not forever, but if for the next two, three, four, five, whatever seasons I have to support a club with a revolving door of some really excellent, hungry, able, exciting, young, ambitious players in Europe as a result of the owner’s transfer policy– even if we end up selling them on for astronomical transfer fees - then I’m happy to do so.

Fatty is even welcome to take some profit if he doesn’t just settle for ‘staying in the premier league’, collecting the TV revenue and showing no ambition. If he has seen an angle for getting a damn good scout, a good manager, and a young team together to play attractive football, full of spirit, that will attract future good managers, and good young players when some move on for lots of money, that we all enjoy watching, then he deserves credit. Just give us back Level 7, you bellend.

November 1, 2011

See below…

We went to Stoke, tried to piss off Tony Pulis, Demba scored three, and we beat them ‘cause they’re useless, but Dan dried his balls off before he threw them back on, (so), HAAAAAAIL Danny Simpson…
…to the Macarena.
September 16, 2011
Newcastle 0-0 Manchester United. 19th April 2011. Level 7E. The best of times..

Newcastle 0-0 Manchester United. 19th April 2011. Level 7E. The best of times..

shoes OFF!.. if you love the toon.. shoes OFF!.. if you love the toon.. shoes OFF!.. if you love the tooooon, shoes OFF!.. if you LOVE THE TOON!…